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*E.I.P.R. 162 The HMSO and Ordnance Survey v Green Amps case discusses the fair dealing
exception for research for the first time and implies that copyright could be trumped by the
Re-Use Public Sector Information Regulations. It also raises the question whether protection
of the environment can be an arguable defence to copyright infringement.
A few months ago, the Chancery Division gave its ruling in The Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, Ordnance Survey v Green Amps. 1 Themain interest of this case lies in the fact that it is the
first one interpreting the exception of fair dealing for the purposes of research.2 Article 5(3)(a) of the
Copyright Directive,3 which the United Kingdom implemented in the Copyright and Related Rights
Regulations 20034 states that:
“Member Statesmay provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights provided for in Articles 2 and 3
in the following cases (a) use for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research, as
long as the source, including the author's name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be impossible
and to the extent justified by the non-commercial purpose to be achieved”.
It therefore forced the United Kingdom to modify its corresponding exception which previously implied
that commercial research could be fair dealing.5 Accordingly, s.29(1) now provides:
“Fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purposes of research for a
noncommercial purpose does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that it is accompanied
by a sufficient acknowledgement.”
The legislative scene being set, one can turn to the case.
Facts and ruling
The claimants, Ordnance Survey and the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office, have Crown
copyright in digitalmaps. The defendant, Green Amps, a company providing wind turbines that
generate renewable energy, employed a student of the University of Southampton during his
holidays. After the student left, Green Amps used the username and password of one of his fellow
students (that the student they had employed had been using) to download maps from Ordnance
Survey's Digimap database.6 By accessing Digimap in that way, Green Amps would have seen the
screens advising that the maps were copyright and that the service was restricted to educational
institutions and for educational purposes, which included research. Their downloading was clearly
held to be a copyright infringement.
Green Amps sought to rely on several defences. The first lies in the Re-Use of Public Sector
Information Regulations 2005, which implemented Directive 2003/98/EC. It allows public sector
bodies, “to charge only for the cost of reproducing the maps plus a reasonable return on the amount
expended in doing this.”7 Accordingly, for the court, the Regulations did not allow the defendant to
download the maps free of charge, as it did. If someone believes the charge is excessive, they must
use the internal complaints procedure set out in the Regulations, which Green Amps did not do.
Section 29(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988 was Green Amps' second
defence. It argued that it used the maps it downloaded from Digimap for a “mapping tool” which at the
moment of litigation still had “R&D status”. As the end-use of the maps was to make a commercial
toolkit, the judge found that the research was for a commercial purpose and the defence did not
apply. The court added that the dealing was clearly not fair. The amount taken was too great, the
dealing implied competition with the owner's exploitation of *E.I.P.R. 163 his work and the defendant
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must have known that the way it downloaded the material was illegitimate. The defendant raised five
other defences in writing but did not pursue them orally. The judge rejected them all as they were
clearly not applicable. One of them is nevertheless worth mentioning. Green Amps argued that its
toolkit was for the greater good as it assisted in the fight against global warming.
Comment
Unfortunately for copyright scholars, the first case interpreting the research exception is too
straightforward. Nevertheless, it begins to clarify that research must be completely non-commercial,
from beginning to end. To strengthen its ruling, the court could have drawn from the source, i.e. the
Copyright Directive, whose recital 42 gave the answer to the case. It states:
“When applying the exception or limitation for noncommercial educational and scientific research
purposes, including distance learning, the non-commercial nature of the activity in question should be
determined by that activity as such. The organisational structure and the means of funding of the
establishment concerned are not the decisive factors in this respect.”
This can be seen as worrying for academics as most of their research is multi-purpose: for teaching
purposes, for pure research purposes (the publication of an article in a review or journal does not
generally entail the payment of any remuneration or royalties) and for commercial aims (the
publication of a book, as this is generally for profit). Some asked whether this would make the initial
research commercial in nature.8 Arguably, the answer was already given in recital 42 of the Copyright
Directive. Therefore, if an academic re-uses substantial parts of someone's copyright work in a book,
the research becomes commercial or rather it was commercial at the outset. This may arguably not
occur often as the parts taken are generally not substantial in the first place. This is true for literary
works but may be less true for artistic works (graphs and drawings generally have to be reproduced in
their entirety if they are to be understood). The interpretation of the research exception is becoming
important as it is being considered by the Intellectual Property Office, following the Gowers Review
and a consultation has been opened on whether it, and other exceptions, should be reviewed.9
Another interesting point is the possible application of Re-Use of Public Sector Information
Regulations to Crown copyright. Unfortunately, because the defendant did not comply with the
complaints procedure, the court did not have to discuss the application of the Regulations. It would
have provided a useful discussion of whether the Regulations applied, i.e. whether Ordnance Survey
is a public sector body and whether it fulfils a public task when supplying its maps. If it did, it would
have trumped copyright somewhat in the sense that if Green Amps could prove the charge was in
excess of a reasonable return, the latter could have been reduced. These regulations can therefore
be seen as an external limit or exception to one type of copyright--Crown copyright. But beyond this
question, this case raises a more fundamental issue: whether there should be any Crown copyright at
all. In most continental countries and even in the United States,10 official documents are not
copyrighted.11 There is a good reason for this. These documents are produced with taxpayers' money.
The public should not be asked to pay to use works it has already subsidised.12 Arguably, in this case,
the digital maps may not strictly have been official material. Indeed, Ordnance Survey argued that it
was, “an independent non-ministerial government department with Executive Agency status” and was
“managerially separate from government”.13 It added that it finances all its operations through its
revenue whose primary source is the, “licensing income received for digital mapping products
provided in the course of its commercial activities”.14 The court however clearly stated that the claim
was for breach of Crown copyright. If Crown copyright did not exist, the status of Ordnance Survey
would have been decisive: if it was a public sector body or part of the government, it would have lost
the case. It may be time, in view of users' growing anger as to the extent of copyright protection, to
get rid of Crown copyright altogether. This may not be necessary, as copyright owners have to
comply with the Re-Use of Public Sector Information Regulations. In other words, Crown copyright
may in fact be dead letter just because of the Regulations. For clarity's sake however, doing away
with Crown copyright may send a more transparent message to the public and would calm down its
ire a little.
Finally, the argument raised by the defendant regarding the fight against global warming raises some
interesting questions. Surely, the judge implied that the defence did not work because there is no
exception in the CDPA which specifically exempts from copyright infringement a defendant who uses
copyright works in order to lower greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere. But could s.171(3) of
the CDPA be used *E.I.P.R. 164 to that effect?15 Of late, the use of this section has not been very
successful and its interpretation has been rather restrictive.16 However, in Ashdown v Telegraph
Group Ltd, 17 the Court of Appeal left the notion of public interest (albeit only slightly) open. Therefore,
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by analogy with the potential conflicts between copyright and human rights, a defendant may want to
use this section if for instance an environmental statute or a higher environmental norm (e.g. a
directive, a regulation,18 Art.2 of the EC Treaty19 or an international convention20 ) clashes with
copyright law or for that matter any other intellectual property right.21 In the case at hand, Green
Amps' general argument obviously did not convince the court. However, such more elaborated
discourse may convince a court in future, in view of the international and European obligations of the
United Kingdom in the environmental area and more general pressing moral needs. If the argument
convinces the courts, fine tuning will be necessary so that incentives to create copyright works are not
annihilated. Maybe s.171(3) has a brighter future than can be thought. The waves have been made.
So, as the saying goes, let us wait and see.
University of Nottingham.
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